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Abstract
1. Stakeholder cooperation can be vital in managing conservation conflicts. 
Laboratory experiments show cooperation is less likely in the presence of uncer-
tainty. Much less is known about how stakeholders in real-life conservation con-
flicts respond to different types of uncertainty.
2. We tested the effects of different sources of uncertainty on cooperative behaviour 
using a framed field experiment and interviews. The experiment compared a base-
line scenario of perfect certainty with scenarios including either: (a) scientific uncer-
tainty about the effectiveness of a conflict-reduction intervention; (b) administrative 
uncertainty about intervention funding; or (c) political uncertainty about the extent 
of community support. We applied these scenarios to a conservation conflict in the 
Outer Hebrides, Scotland, involving the management of geese to simultaneously 
meet both conservation and farming objectives. We asked 149 crofters (small-scale 
farmers) if they would commit to cooperate with others by helping fund a goose 
management plan given the three sources of uncertainty.
3. On average, intention to cooperate was highest (99%) in scenarios without uncer-
tainty, and lowest under administrative uncertainty (77%). Scientific uncertainty 
and political uncertainty both had less of an effect, with over 95% of crofters pre-
dicted to be willing to cooperate in these scenarios. Crofters who indicated con-
cern for other crofters suffering the impact of geese were more likely to cooperate. 
The longer an individual had been a crofter, the less likely they were to cooperate.
4. Synthesis and applications. Crofters’ intention to cooperate is high but lessened by 
uncertainty, especially over the commitment from other stakeholders such as gov-
ernment, to cooperate on goose management. Existing cooperation on goose man-
agement may be at risk if uncertainty is not reduced outright or commitments 
between parties are not strengthened. This has wide applicability, supporting the 
need for researchers and government advisers to: (a) determine how uncertainty 
will impact intention of stakeholders to cooperate; and (b) take steps (such as 
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1  | INTRODUC TION
Conflicts in conservation are ubiquitous around the globe and are 
damaging to both conservation efforts and people's lives (Redpath 
et al., 2013). Fostering cooperation between stakeholders with con-
flicting values is a priority of conservation conflict management as 
it builds trust and reduces conflict, both under experimental con-
ditions and in real- life (Yamagishi, 2005; Young et al., 2016b). One 
important factor that reduces the chances of achieving cooperation 
in conflict is uncertainty, which will generally decrease the tendency 
to trust and cooperate (Rapoport, Sundali, & Seale, 1996). Rittel and 
Webber (1973) describe three broad sources of uncertainty in so-
cial ecological systems (SES): scientific uncertainty from incomplete 
knowledge of the research system; political uncertainty regarding 
power relationships and values; and administrative uncertainty sur-
rounding cost and responsibilities.
Experimental economics methods have been used to test coop-
eration in collective- action problems (Cárdenas & Ostrom, 2004), 
including in the presence or absence of uncertainty. For example, 
Barrett and Dannenberg (2012) used laboratory experiments with 
volunteers to investigate decision- making in the context of climate 
change negotiations, showing that uncertainty of the position of an 
emission threshold resulted in lower cooperation than uncertainty 
surrounding the impacts of exceeding that threshold. However, vol-
unteers in a laboratory setting will act differently to stakeholders 
in a real- world situation (Levitt & List, 2007). Working with stake-
holders involved in a conservation conflict (rather than with vol-
unteers) and framing the experiment in a way which reflects a real 
collective- action problem, allows real- life aspects of the conflict 
such as knowledge of the system, underlying values and perceptions 
of others, to be taken into account. Here, we use an experimental 
economics method to explore how three types of uncertainty (sci-
entific uncertainty, administrative uncertainty and political uncer-
tainty) influence the intention to cooperate, of people in a real- life 
conservation conflict.
Conservation conflicts involving the damage of crops by wild-
life are widespread globally (Treves, Wallace, Naughton-Treves, & 
Morales, 2006). In Northern Europe, reduction of agricultural yield 
due to grazing of wild geese is a well- documented problem (Cusack 
et al., 2018; Simonsen, Tombre, & Madsen, 2017). Methods for re-
ducing goose damage to crops include regulating population (e.g. 
shooting), non- lethal scaring or providing sacrificial feeding areas (Fox, 
Elmberg, Tombre, & Hessel, 2016). Stakeholders involved in a goose 
conflict can include those who: suffer directly from goose damage; 
wish to maintain the conservation status of the geese and their habi-
tat; are responsible for scientific support of management; are required 
to fulfil practical management activities; and, provide funding or prac-
tical support. Mapping the specific stakeholders and uncertainties has 
been identified an important step in understanding the context for 
conservation conflict management (Redpath et al., 2013); however, 
less is known regarding how cooperative behaviour of stakeholders in 
a conflict is affected by different sources of uncertainty.
In this paper, we test how scientific, administrative and politi-
cal uncertainties impact on stakeholders’ willingness to cooperate 
on goose management in the Outer Hebrides, Scotland. Resident 
greylag goose (Anser anser) numbers have been increasing steadily 
from historic low points in the mid- twentieth century, to record 
highs. While this is seen by many as a conservation success story, 
the geese are responsible for damage to arable crops and to pasture 
intended for livestock. (Bainbridge, 2017; Mitchell, Griffin, Trinder, 
& Newth, 2010). The majority of agricultural activity in the Outer 
Hebrides takes place on crofts; small- scale farms of typically 5 ha, 
culturally unique to the more remote and less productive areas of 
the Highlands and Islands of Scotland. Crofting is regarded histor-
ically and legally as a distinct category of farming in Scotland and 
is recognised by the Scottish Government as being vital in main-
taining the population of remote areas, supporting local businesses 
and managing important natural habitats (Scottish Government, 
2016). Crofters (farmers of croft land) impacted by geese essen-
tially take part in a form of public goods game, where they each 
choose whether to voluntarily contribute to the maintenance of a 
non- excludable, non- rivalrous public good (cooperate with goose 
management by contributing to scaring actions) or not (defect). 
Defection is less costly in the short term where benefits of the 
public good can be obtained without contribution (elsewhere called 
free- riding) but runs the risk of losing the benefits should enough 
others do the same.
Presenting crofters with a set of four public goods scenarios for 
goose management—a baseline with no uncertainty and three treat-
ments with differing sources of uncertainty—we aimed to:
1. examine how crofters’ intention to cooperate was influenced 
by different types of uncertainty
2. determine which variables (e.g. crofting location, time spent as a 
crofter, experiences of goose damage) were most important for 
describing cooperative behaviour.
uncertainty reduction, communication or acceptance) to reduce the negative impact 
of uncertainty on cooperation.
K E Y W O R D S
conflict, conservation management, decision-making, experimental economics, goose, public 
goods game, uncertainty
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2  | MATERIAL S AND METHODS
2.1 | Study area
North Uist, Benbecula and South Uist (hereafter, the Uists), are part 
of the Outer Hebrides; an island chain off the northwest coast of 
Scotland, UK. The Uists provide year- round habitat for greylag geese 
which damage both arable crop and pasture (Bainbridge, 2017). 
Non- lethal goose scaring methods have limited success (Simonsen, 
Madsen, Tombre, & Nabe-Nielsen, 2016). Greylag geese can be le-
gally shot during a winter open season (September to February). Out 
of season, geese can be shot under licence only.
Goose management efforts had been ongoing for over a decade, 
but in 2012, a new multi- stakeholder local goose management group 
(LGMG), funded by the Scottish Government was created in the 
Uists. Stakeholders include crofters, government, conservation or-
ganisations, croft owners and recreational wildfowl shooters (SNH, 
2016). A 5- year adaptive management pilot was designed to test if 
shooting levels could be managed to decrease goose damage whilst 
maintaining the conservation status of the geese (SNH, 2016). The 
pilot uses a mixture of volunteer and paid shooters who spend sev-
eral hours a day in designated areas, carrying out lethal and non- 
lethal scaring throughout August and September. The pilot covers 
areas on the western side of the Uists where the arable crops are 
grown and uses population modelling to determine annual shooting 
targets (SNH, 2016).
2.2 | Crofter recruitment and data collection
In August 2016, a list of all crofts in Uist (N = 1,579) was obtained 
(Registers of Scotland, 2016). Potential interviewees were sequen-
tially approached down a randomised copy of the list, until the end 
of the data collection campaign in November 2016. This resulted 
in 149 crofters agreeing to be interviewed. We used face- to- face 
interviews to ensure crofters’ understanding of the questions and 
to capture qualitative responses accurately. Information from 
crofters on themselves, their crofting and their experiences of 
goose impact was collected using a structured questionnaire, to 
allow statistical analyses on the data collected (Newing, 2011). 
For full recruitment, pilot and collection methods, see Supporting 
Information. Ethical approval for this study was granted by 
Biological and Environmental Sciences Ethical Review Committee, 
University of Stirling.
2.3 | Willingness to pay
Crofters were asked if they would be willing to pay (WTP) an annual 
fee along with other crofters, for a project which would completely 
mitigate all the negative impacts of the geese, using a contingent val-
uation technique (Pearce, Ece, & Özedemiroglu, 2002). Those who 
were unwilling to pay were asked to give reasons. The responses 
were then coded post- hoc using theoretical thematic analysis (Braun 
& Clarke, 2006). Those who responded that they would be WTP 
were then asked to indicate how much they would pay annually into 
a fund with other crofters for 100% mitigation of the negative goose 
impacts (hereafter, the WTP amount or Cwtp). The primary aim was to 
identify a WTP amount for each individual which could then be used 
in the subsequent cooperation scenario. This was done to account 
for individual differences in value placed on goose impact reduction. 
The stated WTP amount was then repeatedly used in each coopera-
tion scenario (see below). Where crofters were WTP but could not 
specify an amount, the modal WTP amount identified  during piloting 
(£50 per year) was used as Cwtp.
2.4 | Cooperation scenario
We presented crofters with four scenarios, each detailing a hypo-
thetical goose management plan, using summary cards (see Figure 
S1). Crofters could choose to either support the plan (intention to 
cooperate), or not (intention to defect). Both choices incurred a cost 
to the crofter, a resulting reduction in goose impact, and a thresh-
old number of crofters that would be required for the management 
plan to be enacted. This choice is akin to a public good game, where 
the crofter's payoff (a utility function made up of the sum of the 
level of goose impact and cost of joining a goose management plan) 
is dependent on their own course of action as well as the actions of 
others (to meet the threshold number required) (Table 1). The goose 
management plan outlined in the baseline scenario resulted in a de-
crease of negative goose impact (Cd) down to half the current im-
pact levels. The WTP amount (Cwtp) previously stated by the crofter 
was for 100% reduction in negative goose impact. Therefore, the 
cost to each crofter (Cmp) of a management plan which achieved half 
that reduction as is the case in the baseline scenario, was 0.5Cwtp. 
The management plan was presented as receiving partial payment 
from government funds equal to 0.25Cwtp, so a cooperating crofter 
would receive a 50% reduction in goose impact for a Cmp = 0.25Cwtp. 
This resulted in a total payoff to the crofter of Cd + Cmp = 0.5Cwtp 
+ 0.25Cwtp = 0.75Cwtp. However, the hypothetical management plan 
needed the number of crofters signing up (Nc) to be at least half 
of all the crofters in the Uists (N). If this threshold (Nc/N) was not 
reached, crofters did not pay anything (Cmp = 0) but there was no 
goose impact reduction (Cd = Cwtp), so total payoff is Cd + Cmp = Cwtp 
+ 0 = Cwtp. Choosing to defect always set Cmp = 0. The crofter then 
suffered the full negative impact if the threshold was not reached 
(as above), or if the threshold was reached the crofter received the 
benefit of impact reduction without paying for the cost.
Three other scenarios were the same as the baseline, but each 
contained a single type of uncertainty (Table 1):
• The ‘Scientific’ scenario was described to crofters as representing 
managers’ incomplete knowledge of goose ecology resulting in 
uncertainty to impact reduction, Cd.
• The ‘Administrative’ scenario was described as representing man-
agers’ incomplete knowledge of public funding for the manage-
ment plan resulting in uncertainty to the cost of the plan to the 
crofter, Cmp.
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• The ‘Political’ scenario was described as representing managers’ 
incomplete knowledge of how much support would be needed for 
the plan to be initiated, resulting in uncertainty to the threshold 
of cooperation required from crofters, Thuc.
The baseline was always presented to crofters first, and the fol-
lowing three treatments were randomised. The fixed annual costs 
remain the same so as time increases, the average payoffs for all 
four scenarios become equivalent (Table S1). To evaluate the croft-
ers’ beliefs about how others would behave in the same scenario, 
we used a wager method. After each decision, crofters were asked 
to estimate what percentage of all the crofters in the Uists would 
cooperate, by splitting a hypothetical £20 wager between 20 equal 
cells each representing a 5% block of the population. For example, 
if the crofter thought that between 46% and 55% of others would 
cooperate, they would write ‘10’ in each of the ‘46%–50%’ and 
‘51%–55%’ cells. If the crofter felt they could not estimate or they 
felt there was an equal chance of all outcomes, they would write ‘1’ 
in each of the 20 cells. A fixed wager allowed crofters to express 
confidence in their prediction, responding with the wager spread 
over a large or small range.
2.5 | Statistical analyses
To examine how uncertainty affects the intention to cooperate, as 
well as which background and impact experience characteristics 
most strongly predict intent to cooperate, we ran four linear mixed 
effects models. Analyses were focused on how intention to coop-
erate and WTP for goose management were influenced by three 
groups of variables. Firstly, the value a crofter places on cooperation 
may depend on their current situation including size of their croft, 
the extent of their crofting experience or their existing access to 
goose management support via the croft owner or LGMG. Secondly, 
intention to cooperate may stem from wanting to mitigate personal 
impacts of geese such as time and money costs. We also include 
variables to capture crofters wishing to mitigate goose impacts on 
their community or on natural habitats. Finally, crofters who are 
aware of existing goose management through formal organisations 
may support cooperation with other crofters, or conversely believe 
that responsibility lies elsewhere. The individual variables for each of 
the groups are shown Table 2.
Firstly, for each analysis a ‘global’ model was built containing the 
predictor and random variables thought relevant to that analysis. 
The function ‘dredge’ (r package MuMin) was then used on the global 
models to build and rank models by finite- sample corrected Akaike 
information criteria values (AICc) calculated using maximum likeli-
hood. No interactions between variables resulted in a better fitted 
model, according to AICc. Best- fitting models (ΔAICc < 2) were re-
tained and were then standardised by dividing the continuous fixed 
variables by two standard deviations allowing direct comparison 
of coefficients between continuous and binary variables (Gelman, 
2008).
The area under the curve (AUC) of receiver operating character-
istic (ROC) plots was calculated for all models with a binary output 
TABLE  1 Crofter payoff (per year) matrices under four treatments of varied uncertainty. Here, payoffs are costs to the crofter, so rational 
behaviour seeks to minimise total costs under each treatment. Total cost to the crofter in bold, is the sum of the respective cost of 
management plan (Cmp) and the cost of the negative goose impacts (Cd). Table S2 shows a worked example
Scenario Cooperation threshold Cooperate Defect
Baseline Nc < 0.5N Cmp = 0 
Cd = Cwtp
=Cwtp Cmp = 0 
Cd = Cwtp
= Cwtp
Nc ≥ 0.5N Cmp = 0.25Cwtp
Cd = 0.5Cwtp
=0.75Cwtp Cmp = 0 
Cd = 0.5Cwtp
=0.5Cwtp
Scientific
Duc = Dlow or Dhigh, where
P(Dlow) = P(Dhigh)  = 0.5
Nc < 0.5N Cmp = 0 
Cd = Cwtp
=Cwtp Cmp = 0 
Cd = Cwtp
=Cwtp
Nc ≥ 0.5N Cmp = 0.25Cwtp
Cd = Duc
=0.25Cwtp+Duc Cmp = 0 
Cd = Duc
=Duc
Administrative
Cuc = 0 or Chigh, 
where
P(0) = P(Chigh)  = 0.5
Nc < 0.5N Cmp = 0 
Cd = Cwtp
=Cwtp Cmp = 0 
Cd = Cwtp
=Cwtp
Nc ≥ 0.5N Cmp = Cuc
Cd = 0.5Cwtp
=Cuc + 0.5Cwtp Cmp = 0 
Cd = 0.5Cwtp
=0.5Cwtp
Political
Thuc = Thlow or Thhigh, where
P(Thlow)  = P(Thhigh) = 0.5
Nc < Thuc Cmp = 0 
Cd = Cwtp
=Cwtp Cmp = 0 
Cd = Cwtp
=Cwtp
Nc ≥ Thuc Cmp = 0.25Cwtp
Cd = 0.5Cwtp
=0.75Cwtp Cmp = 0 
Cd = 0.5Cwtp
=0.5Cwtp
Nc, total number of crofters choosing “cooperate”; N, total population of crofters in the Uists; Cmp, cost of management plan; Cd, cost of negative goose 
impacts; Cwtp, crofter WTP to eliminate all current negative goose impact; Cuc, cost of management plan under uncertainty; Chigh = 0.5Cwtp, high cost; 
Duc, cost of negative goose impacts caused under uncertainty; Dlow = 0.25Cwtp, low level of damage; Dhigh = 0.75Cwtp, high level of damage; Thuc, thresh-
old number of crofters choosing “cooperate” required for management plan to be enacted under uncertainty; Thlow = 0.25N, low threshold; 
Thhigh = 0.75N, high threshold.
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variable to assess the ability of each model to correctly discriminate 
between a randomly chosen positive response and a randomly cho-
sen negative response. A value of 0.7 or greater was considered 
as having acceptable discriminatory ability (Sommerville, Milner-
Gulland, Rahajaharison, & Jones, 2010).
All model analyses were done in RStudio version 1.0.136, run-
ning r version 3.1.2. and using r packages lMe4 (Bates, Mächler, 
Bolker, & Walker, 2014), glMMADMB (Bolker, Skaug, Magnusson, & 
Nielsen, 2012) and pROC (Robin et al., 2011).
2.6 | Intention to cooperate
Two global models were built to investigate intention to cooperate. 
The first willingness to pay (WTP) global model included all crofters, 
whereas the second only included those advancing to the cooperation 
scenario. Both models have a binary response variable (Cooperate/
Defect), so we used generalised linear mixed effects models (GLMMs) 
with binomial error structure and a logit link. For predictor variables 
included in the WTP global model (see Table 2): CE1- 4, IG1- 6 and FO1- 
2. Following simplification of the first global model, only predictor vari-
ables which were significant in at least one of the best- fitting models 
were included in the global model for the cooperation scenario (CE1, 
CE4, IG3- 4, IG6, FO1- 2). Residential location (R1) was included as the 
random variable for both models, and unique identifier (R2) was in-
cluded in the cooperation scenario model only, as it contained repeated 
measurements from individuals. The cooperation scenario model also 
included the study treatment predictor variable, uncertainty type (sci-
entific, administrative, political or baseline/no uncertainty).
2.7 | Willingness to pay – amount
The WTP amount global model used the same predictor and ran-
dom variables as the WTP global model above. The response vari-
able was amount WTP in British Pounds. We used a zero- inflated 
mixed effects model with a negative binomial distribution, which 
accounts for the large difference between mean and variance of the 
responses and the high number of zeros in the data caused by those 
unwilling to cooperate (UTC; Zuur, Ieno, & Elphick, 2010).
2.8 | Perception of others’ intention to cooperate
Predictor variables included in this global model were the same as 
for the cooperation scenario, with the addition of the measure of 
how crofters compared their own goose damage with that of others 
(Table 2, IG7) and a binary predictor (cooperate/defect) variable 
indicating if the crofter had chosen to cooperate themselves under 
the equivalent scenario. We again used GLMMs with binomial error 
structure and a logit link. Data were collected as a wager. Crofters 
readily engaged with this method, however responses were mostly 
constrained to a narrow numerical range, and models with continuous 
responses failed to converge. Consequently, we converted these data 
into a binary output. If the wager ≥£10 across the range 51%–100%, we 
recorded that the crofter believed that the threshold of Uist crofters 
required to initiate the goose management plan would be passed.
3  | RESULTS
All best fitted models had ΔAICc ≤ 2 (Tables S4–S7 for the output 
of all best fitted models). Results from the simplest (lowest number 
TABLE  2 Variables measured for modelling intention to 
cooperate and willingness to pay for goose management. Not all 
predictor and random variables were included in all models
Groups of variables Variables measured (units)
Crofting experience 
R epresenting individuals’ connection 
to crofting and access to support
CE1: Time spent as a crofter 
(years)
CE2: Area of crofting land 
(Hectares)
CE3: Croft owner identity 
(North Uist Estate, Storas 
Uibhist community estate, 
Scottish Government or 
owner occupier)
CE4: Township in Local 
Goose Management Group 
area (yes or no)
Impact of geese 
R epresenting the range of direct 
impacts geese have on crofters
IG1: Goose damage on their 
croft (yes or no)
IG2: Incurring of financial 
costs due to crop loss (yes 
or no)
IG3: Incurring of financial 
costs from scaring geese 
(yes or no)
IG4: Incurring of time costs 
from scaring geese 
themselves (yes or no)
IG5: Personal concern about 
damage to natural habitats 
by geese (yes or no)
IG6: Personal concern about 
damage to other crofters’ 
crops (yes or no)
IG7: Damage suffered 
compared to other crofters 
in the Uists (less, similar, 
more or unsure)
Formal organisations 
R epresenting engagement with formal 
groups involved in goose 
management
FO1: Member of the 
Scottish Crofting 
Federation (yes or no)
FO2: Awareness of the 
existing goose management 
plan (yes or no)
Random variables 
I ncluded to account for the structure 
of the data
R1: Location of crofter 
(township)
R2: Crofter identification 
(unique study identification 
number)
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of predictor variables) of each best fitted model and predicted ef-
fect sizes are described below and in Tables 3 and 4. Population level 
data for each predictor variable used in the models can be seen in 
Supporting Information.
3.1 | Intention to cooperate
Most of the crofters who were interviewed (76.5%; 95% CI = 69.1%–
82.6%) were WTP for goose management. Reasons for crofters 
being UTC are shown in Table 5. The most common reason under no 
uncertainty was that geese did not affect them enough. In the pres-
ence of each type of uncertainty, the most common reason given 
for UTC behaviour was the unsatisfactory risk of a worse outcome 
compared to the baseline scenario.
Crofters’ concern for others and their time as crofters were the 
two significant predictor variables (Figure 1, Table 3). The longer an 
individual had been a crofter the lower the predicted probability of 
cooperation (e.g. 10 years of crofting P(coop) = 0.75; 50 years of 
crofting P(coop) = 0.51) and crofters who showed concern for oth-
ers had a higher predicted probability of cooperation than those who 
did not (at mean time crofting (32 years), showing concern for others 
P(coop) = 0.86, no concern for others P(coop) = 0.63) (Table 4). Fixed 
effects accounted for 13% of total variation in the model but there 
was essentially no variation between locations (Table S4). There was 
no significant difference (assessed by AICc) between models with 
and without the random variable. The AUC of the ROC was 0.72.
Under all treatments of the cooperation scenario, most crofters 
were WTP for goose management. Under the uncertainty scenar-
ios, type of uncertainty was the only significant predictor variable 
for intention to cooperate (Figure 1, Table 3). In the absence of un-
certainty (baseline), predicted probability of cooperation was >0.98 
(Table 4). The presence of each of the three types (scientific, admin-
istrative and political) significantly decreased the predicted proba-
bility of cooperation compared to the baseline. The greatest effect 
was seen in the administrative scenario (P(coop) = 0.77), followed by 
small but significant effects with scientific (P(coop) = 0.93) and polit-
ical (P(coop) = 0.98) (Table 4). Fixed variables accounted for 26% of 
the total variation and variation due to random variables accounted 
for 44% (Rm
2 = 0.26, Rc
2 = 0.70). The AUC of the ROC for this model 
was 0.96.
3.2 | Willingness to pay – amount
The modal WTP amount was £50 per year and the mean £59.81 per 
year. Cost of goose scaring (time) and concern for others suffering 
damage were the two significant predictor variables for WTP 
amount (Figure 1, Table 3). A crofter who had not spent time scaring 
geese and was not concerned for others would pay £34.16 (Table 4), 
whereas those who had spent time scaring geese were WTP £73.98 
and those indicating concern for others would pay £52.27. The 
model variance attributable to crofter location (random variable) 
was 0.13 (Table S4).
3.3 | Perception of others’ intention to cooperate
Individual cooperation, type of uncertainty, membership of SCF and 
perceived relative level of goose damage (Figure 1, Table 3) were all 
significant predictor variables for perception of others’ cooperation. 
Predictor variable
(a) 
Cooperation 
scenario
(b) 
Willingness 
to pay
(c)
Willingness to 
pay – amount
(d) 
Perception 
of others
Goose damage wrt Uist average
Less damage −3.16*
More damage −3.82
Don’t know 0.22
Membership of SCF −2.54
Time as a crofter −0.97*
Cost of goose scaring 
(time)
0.78***
Concern for others 1.30* 0.43*
Uncertainty type
Scientific −3.20*** −1.84**
Administrative −4.57*** −2.94***
Political −2.10* −1.76**
Individual cooperation 3.45***
Random effects 
included
Location; 
participant
Location Location Participant
Receiver operating 
characteristic; area 
under curve
0.96 0.72 NA 0.99
TABLE  3 Standardised effect size of 
predictor variables on: intention to 
cooperate with other crofters on a 
cooperative goose management plan 
under different types of uncertainty (a) or 
with no uncertainty (b); amount willing to 
pay into a cooperative goose management 
plan (c); and crofters’ prediction of others 
to cooperate (d). Outputs are from the 
simplest, best- fitting models. Effect sizes 
have been standardised *(p < 0.05); 
**(p < 0.01); ***(p < 0.001)
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Compared to a baseline (of individual cooperation, no uncertainty, 
no membership of SCF and a perceived average level of goose dam-
age, P(coop) = 0.93), the presence of each type of uncertainty had a 
negative effect on predicted probability of cooperation (Table 4). 
Again, the greatest effect was seen with administrative uncertainty 
(P(coop) = 0.36), followed by scientific (P(coop) = 0.63), and then politi-
cal (P(coop) = 0.65). Compared to the baseline model those who per-
ceived they have suffered less than average damage were less likely to 
predict others as cooperating (P(coop) = 0.35). Having the perception 
of suffering more damage than others or a ‘don't know’ response had 
no significant impact, compared to those who had a perception of av-
erage damage. Compared to the baseline model, crofters who did not 
cooperate themselves were less likely to predict others would cooper-
ate also (P(coop) = 0.10). Fixed variables account for 27% of the total 
variation and variation due to random variables accounted for 62% 
(Rm
2 = 0.27, Rc
2 = 0.88). The AUC of the ROC was 0.99.
4  | DISCUSSION
4.1 | How uncertainty affects crofters’ intention to 
cooperate
When faced with a choice of discrete courses of action, people gen-
erally select those with lower uncertainty (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Lundhede, Jacobsen, Hanley, Strange, & Thorsen., 2015). 
This expectation is supported by our findings, with the presence of 
scientific uncertainty (from incomplete knowledge of the research 
system), administrative uncertainty (surrounding cost and respon-
sibilities) and political uncertainty (regarding power relationships 
and values) each significantly decreasing the predicted probability 
of cooperation compared to a baseline scenario with no uncertainty.
Administrative uncertainty causes the largest decrease in terms 
of probability of cooperation. The administrative treatment was pre-
sented as uncertainty about whether public funding would be able 
to either pay all the cost of the management plan (thus, free for the 
crofter) or pay nothing towards the plan (doubling the cost to the 
crofter compared with other treatments). A view of shared respon-
sibility was evident under the scenario of administrative uncertainty 
as the second most given reason for defecting was that others should 
contribute to goose management (Table 5). In this case, administra-
tive uncertainty caused crofters to question the commitment of an-
other stakeholder group, causing defection.
The negative effect of scientific uncertainty on probability of co-
operation was small but statistically significant. Scientific uncertainty 
was framed as full enactment of management actions but with ecolog-
ical uncertainty of how actions would affect the geese and the result-
ing level of damage caused. Here, defecting crofters did not mention 
other stakeholders (as with administrative uncertainty), so seemed to 
TABLE  4 Example model predictions 
to illustrate how combinations of 
significant predictor variables affect: 
Probability of intention to cooperate, 
P(coop) (models a, b and d) or willingness 
to pay amount, £ (model c). Only the 
simplest, best- fitting models are shown. 
All values in parentheses are 95% 
confidence intervals
Selected model structure Model prediction
(a) Cooperation scenario P(coop)
Baseline 0.98 (0.97–1.00)
+Scientific Uncertainty 0.93 (0.81–0.98)
+Administrative Uncertainty 0.77 (0.58–0.89)
+Political Uncertainty 0.98 (0.91–0.99)
(b) Willingness to pay P(coop)
a32 years crofting − concern for others 0.63 (0.45–0.78)
a32 years crofting + concern for others 0.86 (0.78–0.92)
10 years crofting − concern for others 0.75 (0.45–0.92)
50 years crofting − concern for others 0.51 (0.10–0.91)
(c) Willingness to pay − Amount Willingness to pay amount (£)
−cost of goose scaring − concern for others 34.16 (24.22–48.18)
−cost of goose scaring + concern for others 52.27 (31.60–86.48)
+cost of goose scaring − concern for others 73.98 (47.51–115.18)
(d) Perception of others P(coop)
Goose damage wrt Uist
bBaseline 0.93 (0.64–0.99)
−same damage + less damage 0.35 (0.11–0.71)
+Scientific Uncertainty 0.63 (0.34–0.85)
+Administrative Uncertainty 0.36 (0.16–0.65)
+Political Uncertainty 0.65 (0.35–0.86)
−Individual cooperation 0.10 (0.19–0.43)
a32 years is the mean time crofting. bBaseline model for comparison: Goose damage wrt Uist (same) 
- uncertainty + Individual cooperation - membership of the SCF. 
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Reason
Scenario type (number of non- cooperation responses)
Cooperation scenario
WTP (34) Scientific (13) Admin. (29) Political (7)
The issue doesn’t affect 
me enough
12 (35.3%) 1 (7.7%) 3 (10.3%) 1 (14.3%)
I will be leaving crofting 
soon
7 (20.6%)
Goose management is not 
possible
3 (8.8%)
Non- crofting groups 
should (also) contribute 
funding
8 (23.5%) 12 (41.4%)
Crofters should be 
individually responsible
4 (11.8%) 1 (14.3%)
Not enough other 
crofters will cooperate
2 (15.4%) 1 (3.4%) 3 (42.9%)
There is too much risk 9 (69.2%) 15 (51.7%) 3 (42.9%)
Uncertainty gives excuse 
for poor management
1 (7.7%) 1 (14.3%)
TABLE  5 Reasons given by crofters for 
choosing not to cooperate in the 
willingness to pay (WTP) and in the three 
scenarios with uncertainty. n = 138 for 
WTP and 97 for the other three scenarios. 
Crofters were asked if they were WTP for 
goose management and if they indicated 
they would, then they were given four 
further choices (cooperation scenarios). 
The baseline treatment is not included in 
the table as there were no non- 
cooperation responses. Sum of 
percentages may be greater than 100% as 
crofters could give more than one reason
F I G U R E  1 Standardised effect size (±95% confidence intervals) of predictor variables on: intention to cooperate with other crofters 
on a cooperative goose management plan under different types of uncertainty (a) or with no uncertainty (b); amount willing to pay into 
a cooperative goose management plan (c); and crofters’ prediction of others to cooperate (d). Outputs are from the simplest, best- fitting 
models. Effect sizes have been standardised *(p < 0.05); **(p < 0.01); ***(p < 0.001). Full model outputs in Tables S3–S6, for plots a- d, 
respectively
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be reacting to uncertainty directly (Table 3). In this scenario, general 
aversion to uncertainty may be contributing to much of the decrease 
in intention to cooperate (Lundhede et al., 2015).
Compared to the baseline scenario, the decrease in effect size 
under political uncertainty was very small but significant. The un-
certainty in this scenario affected how many other people crofters 
thought might need to get involved, but also changed the conditions 
for accessing benefits without contribution. The small effect size 
means we cannot separate decreased probability of cooperation 
under political uncertainty from the general negative utility experi-
enced from any type of uncertainty (Lundhede et al., 2015).
4.2 | Describing crofters’ cooperative behaviour
Financial loss via goose damage was not a significant predictor varia-
ble for any model. Crofters were more likely to cooperate on a goose 
management plan and would pay more into such a plan when they 
indicated concern for others suffering from goose impacts. This pat-
tern of cooperation would be expected if goose management pay-
ments were seen more as a charitable donation than self- serving 
(Park & Lee, 2015). The probability of cooperation decreased with 
increased time as a crofter. This result may be driven by crofters ap-
proaching retirement as 20% of crofters who chose to defect gave 
the reason that they were exiting crofting soon.
Many crofters chose to defect but not one crofter indicated that 
they were aiming to gain benefits without contributing. Crofters may 
not want to gain benefits this way because they see it as unfair, or 
they would not want to be seen as being unfair by their community. 
Small agricultural communities have strong reciprocal relationships 
between individuals (Sutherland & Burton, 2011), which can de-
crease behaviour perceived as unfair (Ostrom, 2010).
The mean WTP amount of £59.81 per year was similar to the 
£29.67 per year (£44.27, adjusted for inflation) which Hanley, 
MacMillan, Patterson, and Wright (2003) showed in a willingness 
to accept study for hypothetical goose population increase in Islay, 
Scotland. Those who have spent their own time scaring geese were 
WTP more into a cooperative goose management plan. Successful 
goose scaring is resource- intensive, as the geese repeatedly be-
come accustomed to the methods used which then must be changed 
(Simonsen et al., 2016). Our results indicate that the opportunity 
costs associated with scaring geese are important enough to signifi-
cantly increase WTP amount in the Uists.
4.3 | Predicting others behaviour
The largest predictor of whether crofters thought others would co-
operate with each management scheme was their own preference 
to cooperate or defect. All types of uncertainty were also significant 
in the same direction and in the same rank order as with crofters’ 
own choices. Individual crofters believed other crofters in the Uists 
would act similarly to themselves and did not indicate they thought 
others would attempt to gain benefits without contributing. Both 
these crofter predictions are consistent with the false consensus 
effect, where people project their own behaviour onto others (Ross, 
Greene, & House, 1977).
4.4 | Limitations of the method
The use of contingent valuation methods to accurately value goods 
and services has been criticised. For example, WTP suffers from hy-
pothetical biases, differences between willingness to pay and will-
ingness to accept values for similar goods, and assumptions about 
how goods may be embedded in one another (Hausman, 2012). 
Hypothetical bias can be reduced by offering payments based on 
decisions made in the experiment, but it can unrealistically incentiv-
ise individualistic behaviour (Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2008). Using the 
WTP amount from this study would not be appropriate for costing 
of a Uist goose management funding scheme. Where good, inde-
pendent, data are available for goose management costs, a discrete 
choice experiment between alternative management actions could 
elicit a more accurate value than our contingent valuation (Johnston 
et al., 2017). The WTP variables in our modelling did not include a 
measure of personal wealth or income, which may be expected to 
have a significant influence on WTP amount (Pearce et al., 2002). 
The aim of identifying an individual WTP amount for each crofter 
to use in the cooperation scenario was achieved with our method.
We focused on the predictor variables that significantly affect co-
operation and on the difference between the treatments. However, 
people also tend to overestimate WTP amount when responding to 
scenario questions compared to real- life situations (Murphy, Allen, 
Stevens, & Weatherhead, 2005) and without social interaction peo-
ple overestimate theirs and others’ propensity to cooperate (Vlaev, 
2012). Steps were taken to minimise biases of methodological origin, 
such as by discussing the scenarios in a neutral way. Crofters pre-
dicted that others would make very similar choices to themselves, 
which suggests any bias towards wanting to appear in a good light 
extended beyond themselves to promoting the community as a 
whole. Separating bias from the social norms which we are trying to 
study is an ongoing challenge in field studies such as this.
4.5 | Management implications of multiple system 
uncertainties
The three sources of uncertainty affected crofters’ intention to 
cooperate in different ways. In the presence of administrative un-
certainty, defecting crofters indicated that other groups should 
shoulder some of the burden caused by uncertainty. In the presence 
of scientific uncertainty, no actions by any other group were men-
tioned as being involved in crofter cooperation. In the presence of 
political uncertainty (and in general), cooperating crofters were con-
fident that others would act like them and not try to gain benefits 
without contributing. Prior to management actions being developed, 
an important step is for managers to understand the societal dimen-
sions of a conflict, including stakeholder roles and actions (Young 
et al., 2016a). Our study shows that managers should also include 
an assessment of how stakeholders’ actions may change under 
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different sources of uncertainty, especially if sources are associated 
with particular stakeholder groups.
Once relationships are better understood, steps can then be 
taken to cope with uncertainty. Firstly, uncertainty could be re-
duced by filling scientific research gaps such as the relative efficacy 
of scaring techniques or goose crop selectivity (Fox et al., 2016). But 
the application of increased ecological knowledge alone may have 
suboptimal impact on conflict if other types of uncertainty are not 
also addressed. Reducing reliance on uncertain external funding by 
increasing local fundraising may then decrease the administrative 
uncertainty which caused the greatest decrease in intention to co-
operate. Secondly, in addition to technical solutions for uncertainty 
reduction, stakeholders should indicate a high level of commitment 
to the process (Hemmati, 2002). Longer- term partnerships between 
managers and scientists are advantageous (Moore, Pascoe, Thomas, & 
Keatley, 2017) and transparent communication of commitment could 
lessen the effect that associated uncertainties can have on inten-
tion to cooperate. Finally, embracing the inevitable uncertainty can 
bring positive benefits, such as opportunities for learning, increased 
stakeholder engagement and adaptability (Pe'er, Mihoub, Dislich, & 
Matsinos, 2014). Explicitly including multiple types of uncertainty in 
established participatory decision- making techniques (such as multi-
criteria decision- making or scenario planning) may decrease the neg-
ative impact of uncertainty on levels of cooperation, even though the 
calculated level of uncertainty has not reduced (Mason et al., 2018).
Cooperation in the Uists over goose management has been es-
tablished through formation of the multi- stakeholder LGMG and 
previous commitment to the 5- year adaptive management pilot. 
The current level of cooperation between stakeholders may be at 
risk if future goose management plans cannot reduce administra-
tive uncertainty (for example, by securing funding) nor demonstrate 
commitment to the project (for example, by enshrining another 
multi- year plan).
5  | CONCLUSIONS
Our work illustrates the potential differences in stakeholders’ re-
sponse to uncertainty in the form of cooperation. Reducing scientific 
uncertainty, at which conservation practitioners are likely to be most 
skilled, may not be the most important gap to fill. Variation in behav-
ioural response to uncertainty can be taken into account throughout 
the conflict management process to target the most effective ways 
to either preferentially reduce uncertainty itself or increase the ac-
ceptance of uncertainty amongst stakeholders. Both tactics mark a 
way forward to reducing the impacts that uncertainty can cause.
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